Key-Nets: Optical Transformation Convolutional Networks for Privacy
  Preserving Vision Sensors by Byrne, Jeffrey et al.
Key-Nets: Optical Transformation Convolutional Networks for
Privacy Preserving Vision Sensors
Jeffrey Byrne1, Brian Decann2 and Scott Bloom2
1Visym Labs, Cambridge MA, USA
2Systems & Technology Research, Woburn MA, USA
Abstract
Modern cameras are not designed with computer vision or machine learning as the target applica-
tion. There is a need for a new class of vision sensors that are privacy preserving by design, that do
not leak private information and collect only the information necessary for a target machine learning
task. In this paper, we introduce key-nets, which are convolutional networks paired with a custom
vision sensor which applies an optical/analog transform such that the key-net can perform exact en-
crypted inference on this transformed image, but the image is not interpretable by a human or any other
key-net. We provide five sufficient conditions for an optical transformation suitable for a key-net, and
show that generalized stochastic matrices (e.g. scale, bias and fractional pixel shuffling) satisfy these
conditions. We motivate the key-net by showing that without it there is a utility/privacy tradeoff for
a network fine-tuned directly on optically transformed images for face identification and object detec-
tion. Finally, we show that a key-net is equivalent to homomorphic encryption using a Hill cipher,
with an upper bound on memory and runtime that scales quadratically with a user specified privacy
parameter. Therefore, the key-net is the first practical, efficient and privacy preserving vision sensor
based on optical homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
Modern cameras are not designed with computer vision or machine learning as the target application.
Security cameras are designed for professionals performing a forensic video analysis task, such that full
images of a scene are collected which contain much more information about a scene than may be necessary
for a target computer vision task. For example, a vision sensor with the task of face detection does not
need images of nearby objects in the background, however traditional cameras collect imagery of the entire
scene that can reveal much more information than intended. This is especially true for imagery collected
in private spaces such as homes or businesses. Ideally, a vision sensor is privacy preserving, such that
it never forms a human recoverable image that could leak information and violate end-user privacy if
exposed without consent.
There is a need for novel design for visual sensors that are privacy preserving. Our goal is to replace
traditional lens-based imaging system with a new visual sensor designed with novel diffractive or reflective
optics, optimized for input to machine learning (ML) algorithms. Existing cameras have been successfully
used for machine learning, however in order to protect privacy, such cameras require digital encryption
and are vulnerable to exploitation through third party eavesdropping which risks making private images
public. Our objective is to develop a coupled vision sensor and ML system that: (i) does not create a human
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Figure 1: (left) A keynet is a convolutional network paired with a custom vision sensor which optically
transforms an image such that the keynet can perform exact inference on this transformed image. The
observed sensor measurement is not interpretable by a human (or any other keynet) without knowledge of
the private key, which is encoded in the optics of the privacy preserving vision sensor. (right) A keynet
is designed to perform inference on optical/analog encrypted inputs, by generating keyed layers from a
source conv-net. The output of the keynet is equivalent to the encrypted output of the source conv-net,
without ever exposing the private image of the scene or the private weights of the conv-net.
interpretable image, (ii) the ML system can perform inference directly on the sensor measurements, (iii)
the ML system is “keyed” so that inference can only be performed on observations from the target sensor,
(iv) the parameters of the ML system are encrypted and cannot be inspected or repurposed by an adversary
and (v) images are encrypted and can only be recovered with knowledge of the secret key physically
encoded in the optics.
In this paper, we introduce keynets. A keynet is the combination of a novel vision sensor and a convo-
lutional network designed specifically for this vision sensor. The sensor incorporates an optical transfor-
mation in the optical imaging chain that transforms an image to be uninterpretable by a human. However,
the convolutional network can be designed to perform inference on this optically transformed measure-
ment without requiring an inversion of the optical transformation. This coupling of sensor and machine
learning system enforces privacy preserving vision sensing because a human interpretable image is never
constructed and only the keyed convolutional network can be used for inference on this sensor. This
forms a privacy preserving vision sensor that does not leak personal or private information and cannot be
repurposed to another ML task.
The key contributions of this paper are:
1. Optical transformation requirements. We describe five sufficient conditions for an optical trans-
formation realizable in the optics of a sensor to enable the design of a keynet from a given source
convolutional network.
2. Keynet specification. We introduce the design of a keynet to perform inference on the optical/analog
transformation of the vision sensor, and show that a feasible family of optical transformations is
based on generalized stochastic matrices. This parameterization includes a user specified privacy
parameter (α).
3. Optical element simulation. We show that the vision sensor can be physically realized using op-
tical 3D printed fiber bundles and analog gain preprocessing, as shown by end-to-end simulated
performance.
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4. Optical homomorphic encryption. We show that a keynet is equivalent to a homomorphic encryption
based on the Hill cipher [27], which is physically realized in the optics of the vision sensor. We
describe two well known weaknesses of the Hill cipher and argue that while these weaknesses are
present for a generic cryptosystem, they do not introduce a practical risk for a privacy preserving
vision sensor.
2 Related Work
The related work can be broadly categorized into three areas: visual sensors for machine learning, design
of novel computational optics and homomorphic encryption.
First, sensors for machine learning considers redesigning vision sensors for a targeted machine learning
task. An example is the movement of early layers of a convolutional network into the optical [6][16][19][59]
or analog processing [12] in order to reduce power consumption. The trend towards optical processing has
progressed to consider an all-optical convolutional network [39], nanophotonic CNN systems [42][70]
or optical and analog CNN hybrids [15] to address the challenges of non-linearities in CNN architec-
tures. Recently, there has also been work adapting adversarial learning principles for vision sensor design
[17][37][41][44][47][51][68][69]. However, these privacy preserving approaches have demonstrated a
clear (and undesirable) privacy/utility tradeoff, such that privacy increases at the expense of primary ML
task performance. Our goal is to enable privacy preserving visual sensing without this privacy/utility
tradeoff.
The design and fabrication of novel visual sensors considers introducing new computational optics
or in-sensor analog computation suitable for a target application. For example, a coded aperture sen-
sor [1][2][4][8][14][22][23][36] replaces the lens with phase masks realized as diffractive optical ele-
ments (DOEs) [1][4][57], such that imagery can be recovered using computational photography tech-
niques. Such reconstruction-based approaches are also limited by a privacy/utility tradeoff [13][60]. Re-
cent approaches attempt to eliminate the reconstruction task, but are limited by strict camera assumptions
and vision tasks [20][21][67][72] or design sensors that produce partially human-interpretable images
[10][31][32][48][49][50][71]. Sensor design has considered angle sensitive [16][62] or differential [63]
pixels to compute precise motion or angle distribution of the light field, and single photon avalanche diodes
[34][55] for ultrafast observations. Recent work on 3D printing based on two-photon lithography [64] has
made possible mass production of custom optical elements at large scales. Our goal is to leverage this
capability to design novel privacy preserving optical elements.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) [7][24][29][45] is a form of encryption which allows specific types
of computations to be carried out on ciphertext and generate an encrypted result which, when decrypted,
matches the result of operations performed on the plaintext. Homomorphic encryption has been applied
to convolutional networks to perform computations on encrypted images in: CryptoNets [18][25], FHE-
DiNN [9], cryptoDL [26], MiniONN [40] and Homomorphic CNNs (HCNNs) [5]. These approaches
suffer from: inefficient runtime performance, integer discretized weights [9][25], limited network depth
due to increasing noise effects [5], polynomial approximations to non-linear activation layers [25] or ex-
hibit only partially homomorphic encryption for only additive or multiplicative computations [11][29][54].
Our goal is to enable optical homomorphic encryption that does not suffer from these restrictions, but with
weaker guarantees on security that we will argue is an appropriate tradeoff for a visual sensor.
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3 Keynets
A keynet is an optically transformed convolutional network that can perform inference on data collected
using a specifically designed sensor. In this section, we describe requirements for optical transformation
(§3.1) and network construction (§3.2-3.4) and optical realization (§3.5). Privacy analysis is provided in
supplemental material (§A.7).
Figure 1 shows an comparison of a keynet and a conv-net. In this example, there is a raw image
vectorized to (x0) which is input to a k-layer convolutional network. This network is composed as xk =
N (x0), includes linear and non-linear layers, such that linear layers are represented as a sparse Toeplitz
matrix (W ) and the network outputs inference result xk. The keynet uses private layer keysAi to transform
the network weights Wˆ = AWA−1, such that the source weights cannot be factored to recover either A
or W . The keynet is paired with a custom vision sensor that physically realizes the private image key A0
in an optical and analog transformation chain. Finally, we will show that if the non-linear layers of the
source conv-net are limited to ReLU, then the keynet can operate on the transformed input xˆk = Nˆ (xˆ0)
and xˆk = Akxk. We call this approach optical homomorphic encryption.
Keynets assume the following public and private information. First, the image key A0 is secret. The
physical sensor containing image key A0 is secret, and controlled with physical security (e.g. in a locked
room). The source convolutional network N is secret. The keyed convolutional network Nˆ is public.
Optically transformed images (A0x) are public, and raw images (A−10 A0x) are only recoverable with the
secret image key. Output inference results can be either public or private (§3.4), and if private can only be
recovered knowing the secret embedding key, Ak. The keyed convolutional network Nˆ cannot be used to
recoverA orW , due to the hardness of non-negative matrix factorization (§A.7.1). Therefore, an adversary
would be able to observe only the encrypted inference result Nˆ (A0x), an uninterpretable image (A0x) and
the keyed layer weights (Wˆ ) but not the raw image (x0) or the weights of the source network (W ) or the
raw inference (xk).
3.1 Optical Transformation Function
Consider a family of transformation functions F . A transformation function f ∈ F must satisfy the
following five sufficient feasibility conditions to be considered an optical transformation function:
1. Linear. The function f must be linear (f = A).
2. Invertible. Matrix A must be positive definite.
3. Non-negative. A ≥ 0 for all matrix elements.
4. Commutative. There exists a non-linear activation function g that is commutative with A, such that
A(g(A−1x)) = g(AA−1x) = g(x).
5. Sparse. Given an A ∈ F and B−1 ∈ F , there exists an upper bound such that for any sparse matrix
W , the product AWB−1 is sparse with |AWB−1|0 ≤ s|W |0.
Condition 1 states that the transformation function must be linear, since optical image formation can be
modeled as a linear transformation. Note that this is not a necessary condition, as optical propagation can
include non-linear effects due to non-linear optics or diffraction. Condition 2 states that the transformation
is lossless and the original image can be recovered byA−1Ax. Condition 3 limits a matrix to be physically
realizable as a linear optical element and closely connects the proposed framework with the computational
complexity of non-negative matrix factorization. Condition 4 enables inference in optically encrypted
convolutional networks with non-linear activation function layers. Finally, Condition 5 ensures that the
end-to-end inference in the optically encrypted convolutional network is efficient and does not require the
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product of an infeasibly large dense matrix. A family of transformation functions F is defined to be an
optical transformation function if all members of the family satisfy the five feasibility conditions.
3.2 Optical Transformation Convolutional Networks
Consider a convolutional network N (x) which is the composition of Nk layerwise functions:
N (x) = Nk(Nk−1(...N1(x))) (1)
Given an optical transformation function A and a raw image x, xˆ = Ax is the optical transformation of
the raw image into a sensor observation xˆ. First, we will consider the case whereN is linear only, then we
will extend to consider a full conv-net with non-linear layers.
Consider the case where all layers are linear. In this case, layersNi = W are given by a weight matrix
W which encodes the linear transformation of a trained convolutional network. For example, in a typical
conv-net, linear layers include convolutional, affine, fully connected, dropout and average pooling layers.
Note that since a convolution is a linear operation, it can be represented as a matrix in the form of a sparse
Toeplitz matrix, where the kernel is replicated rowwise. Furthermore, multi-channel tensor inputs can be
flattened to a vector x, such that the linear transformation of the layer is the matrix product of a sparse
weight matrix and dense data vector. Finally, note that without loss of generality, a bias b can be applied
by projective embedding x = [x 1]T and affine augmentation [W b; 0 1]. Then, the conv-net simplifies to
a matrix product:
N (x;W ) =
∏
k
Wkx (2)
where the notation Nˆ(x;W ) corresponds to network N with input x and parameters W . Given an optical
transformation function A, the input Ax can be trivially input to the convolutional network asN (A−1Ax)
by inverting the data prior to inference. However, this requires exposing the image to the network. An
ideal network would be able to perform inference directly on the optically transformed input, Ax, without
requiring inversion.
The linear convolutional network can be constructed to operate on optical transformed inputs as fol-
lows. Linear layers can be replaced by keyed layers Wˆ = AWA−1 using secret layer keysAi, and a secret
image key A0 such that:
N (x;W ) = AkWK . . . (A2W2A−11 )(A1W1A−10 )A0x (3)
Recall that the keys A and inverse A−1 exist by conditions 1 and 2. By associativity, terms (A−1A = I)
cancel, so it follows that (3) is equivalent to (2). Furthermore, by associativity, terms can be grouped into
the product Wˆ = AWA−1. Condition 3 requires that elements of A are non-negative, which enables a
proof that the factorization of Wˆ is equivalent to non-negative matrix factorization, which is NP-hard in
general (§A.7.1). This protects recovery of A from Wˆ . Finally, by condition 5, the product AWA−1 is
sparse, and is at most a factor of α less sparse thanW . This bounds the complexity of matrix multiplication
Wˆx to be at most α times slower thanWx. This enables a practical linear convolutional network operation
that preserves sparsity of Wˆ does not require operations on an impossibly large dense matrix.
Let N (Ax; Wˆ ) be the shorthand notation for the keyed network formed from keyed layers Wˆ on
transformed input A0x, such that:
N (A0x;AWA−1) =
∏
k
WˆkA0x (4)
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Figure 2: Generalized Doubly Stochastic Matrices combine optical and analog processing to form a human
uninterpretable image (bottom right), while preserving the flexibility for partially interpretable images
(middle column) that is similar to etched “optical privacy glass”.
Finally, by associativity, it follows that AkN (x;W ) = N (A0x;AWA−1), since (4) is shorthand for (3)
and we previously showed that (3) is equivalent to (2). This is a homomorphism, such that the trans-
formed conv-net output on the original image x is equivalent to the keyed conv-net output on the optical
transformed image A0x.
Next, consider a non-linear activation function g. An activation function is a non-linear function
typically used in a convolutional network structure to generate the output of a node given inputs. For
example, common non-linear activation layers include rectified linear unit (ReLU), tanh and sigmoid. By
condition 4, we assume that there exists a function g such that g and A are commutative:
Ag(A−1xˆ) = g(AA−1xˆ) = g(xˆ) (5)
This assumption simplifies the non-linear layer to operate directly on the input, which allows the non-linear
layer to be included in the keynet without modification.
Finally, any combination of linear and commutative non-linear layers can be composed into a keynet
as follows.
Ni =
{
Ni(xi−1, AiWA−1i−1) if Ni linear
Ni(xi−1) if commutative non-linear
(6)
This shows that the keyed network can be constructed with an optical transformation function A to en-
able the homomorphism AkN (x;W ) = N (A0x;AWA−1). Inference in the keyed network on the op-
tical transformation is equivalent to inference in the source network on the raw image. This construc-
tion enables efficient inference (condition 5) and is secure from recovery of A (condition 3). Therefore,
N (Ax;AWA−1) is a homomorphic encryption scheme for inference of linearly encrypted images in a
keyed conv-net. We call this optical homomorphic encryption.
3.3 Generalized Doubly Stochastic Matrices
Section 3.1 specified the five conditions for a feasible optical transformation function. Section 3.2 showed
that a feasible optical transformation function can be used to construct a convolutional network that oper-
ates directly on optical transformed input. In this section, we show that the family of generalized doubly
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stochastic matrices satisfies the conditions of an optical transformation function, for choice of activation
function g = ReLU.
A doubly stochastic matrix is defined as follows. First, a permutation matrix or monomial matrix Π is
a square matrix that has exactly one entry of one in each row and each column and zero elsewhere, and
is constructed by permuting the rows of an identity matrix. A doubly stochastic matrix is a non-negative
matrix such that each row and column sums to one, that encodes a “soft” permutation. It is well known
(i.e. the Birkhoffvon Neumann theorem) that every doubly stochastic matrix can be decomposed into a
convex combination of permutation matrices. A generalized doubly stochastic matrix has arbitrary non-
zero entries without requiring the rows and columns to sum to one. This matrix can be defined as the
product of a diagonal matrix D and a doubly stochastic matrix defined as a convex combination of α
permutation matrices:
P = D
∑
i≤α
θiΠi (7)
where Π =
∑
i θiΠi such that
∑
i θi = 1, θ ≥ 0. The convex coefficients θ are selected to enforce that
Π is positive definite. The parameter α encodes the “softness” of the stochastic matrix such that larger α
is more stochastic, and α = 1 is equivalent to a permutation matrix. Furthermore, observe that D can be
extended to encode an (optional) additive bias b through an affine augmentation as [D b; 0 1]. The term
D encodes an elementwise multiplicative scaling and additive bias or photometric degradation, while the
term Π encodes a pixelwise fractional shuffling or geometric degradation.
A generalized doubly stochastic matrix satisfies the five conditions of an optical transformation func-
tion (§3.1).
1. Linear. P is a linear function as represented by a square matrix DΠ.
2. Invertible. P is positive definite if and only if both D and Π are positive definite. A sufficient
condition for P to be positive definite is selecting θ in (7) such that Π is diagonally dominant, and
enforcing diag(D) > 0.
3. Non-negative. Π is non-negative by construction. If D is restricted to have strictly positive diagonal
entries diag(D) > 0, then P is both non-negative and positive definite.
4. Commutative. Let g(x) = ReLU(x) and A be restricted to a generalized permutation matrix (e.g.
α = 1 for eq. 7). Given this restriction, lemma A.1 in the supplementary material provides a proof
of commutativity.
5. Sparse. Given an α, there exists a selection of A ∈ P and B−1 ∈ P such that the product
|AWB−1|0 ≤ α2|W |0, which is an upper bound on sparsity for s = α2. Lemma A.2 in the
supplementary material provides proof of this sparsity upper bound.
3.4 Stochastic Keynets
Section 3.1 specified the five conditions for a feasible optical transformation function. Section 3.2 showed
that a feasible optical transformation function can be used to construct a convolutional network that op-
erates directly on optical transformed input. Section §3.3) showed that the family of generalized doubly
stochastic matrices (e.g. “soft” permutation matrices) satisfied the conditions of an optical transformation
function, for choice of activation function g = ReLU. A stochastic keynet is defined as the selection of
doubly stochastic matrices for keying and ReLU for non-linear activation.
Figure 2 shows examples of generalized stochastic matrices. The horizontal scale shows optical trans-
formations for increasingly random shuffling due to doubly stochastic matrices. The vertical scale shows
analog transformations for increasingly large gains due to the diagonal matrices. The combination of these
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two effects results in a transformed sensor measurement in the bottom right that is uninterpretable to a
human observer.
Construction of a stochastic keynet is as follows:
1. Select a pre-trained source conv-netN that contains only linear and ReLU layers, and a user selected
privacy parameter α on Fα.
2. Randomly select a secret image key A0 ∈ Fα. This is physically realized in the optical and analog
imaging chain for a vision sensor as described in section 3.5.
3. If layerNi is convolutional, randomly select secret layer keyAi ∈ Fα. Convert convolutional kernel
to a sparse Toeplitz matrix and keyed layer following (3). If the convolution includes a bias term,
perform an affine augmentation of the Toeplitz matrix as: [W b; 0 1], with projective embedding of
input tensor [x; 1]. If the layer includes a downsampling stride, the layer keys encode the proper
shape.
4. If Ni is ReLU, randomly select secret layer key Ai ∈ Fα=1 such that Ai is restricted to be a scaled
permutation matrix. Transform the input g(AiA−1i−1x).
5. If Nk is the output layer, select embedding key Ak = I if the inference result is public data, else
randomly select Ak ∈ Fα if the inference is private data.
6. Compose the stochastic keynet Nˆ (A0x; AWA−1) from N (x) following (6).
The stochastic keynet has two restrictions on allowable conv-net topologies. The only non-linear
layer supported by this network is ReLU or ReLU-like variants (e.g. Leaky-ReLU, Parametric ReLU),
as this activation function is commutative with the proposed optical transformation function. All other
non-linear layers are unallowable including: max-pooling, local response normalization (LRN), sigmoid,
tanh and softmax. However, all-convolutional networks have shown that replacing max-pooling with av-
erage pooling and limiting activation functions to ReLU maintains state-of-the-art performance [58]. We
experimentally validate this claim in section 4.
Finally, the keynet exhibits a tradeoff between privacy and memory. A naive Toeplitz matrix construc-
tion has O(N2K) additional parameters than the source network for a layer input tensor of size (N,N)
with K channels. However, these replicated channels are highly compressible. In our supplemental soft-
ware, we introduce a sparse matrix format that leverages repeated submatrices as “tiles”. In general, the
keynet memory requirements scale as O(α2KT ), given an additional tiling factor T dependent on the
sparse matrix storage format. We show keynet memory requirements as a function of privacy parameter α
in section 4.
3.5 Optical Realization
The sufficient conditions for an optical transform in section 3.1 define a feasible family of transformations
for use in a privacy preserving vision sensor. In the supplemental material (§A.5), we show that the selected
family of optical transforms based on generalized stochastic matrices can be physically realized using an
analog and optical processing chain based on 3D printed incoherent fiber bundle faceplates. An optical
fiber bundle faceplate is an optical element constructed using a bundle of multi-micron-diameter optical
fibers bundled into a thin plate with polished faces. A simulated example is shown in Figure 3.
4 Experimental Results
A privacy preserving vision sensor must consider the joint design of the sensor and the ML system. To
justify this claim, we consider the following three experiments:
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Figure 3: Simulation of a 3D printed optical fiber bundle [64] and analog preprocessing to realize a gener-
alized doubly stochastic matrix.
1. Frozen System. Does there exist an optical transformation that degrades the input image, while
preserving performance of a pre-trained ML system? If such a transformation exists, then a keynet would
be unnecessary, since a conv-net could be applied directly to the degraded image, and the degraded image
would not be human interpretable. Experimental results show that the maximum degradation for a pre-
trained network to minimize human perception [53][65] while preserving network performance is still
clearly human observable. This provides evidence that preserving image privacy requires joint design of
the ML system and the transformation. See supplemental material (section A.6.1), for detailed results.
2. Trained System. Can we jointly train an optical transformation and a conv-net to maximally degrade
an image while minimizing an ML task loss? This would also render a keynet unnecessary, as fine-tuning
a conv-net on degraded images would suffice. Experimental results show that jointly learning an image
degradation and a network encoding using an adversarial loss can sufficiently degrade an image to render
it uninterpretable by a human. However, this strategy introduces an undesirable privacy/utility tradeoff
where face identification performance degrades by 12% and object detection degrades by 55%. This
provides further evidence that preserving image privacy requires keying to preserve the source conv-net
performance. See supplemental material (section A.6.2 ) for detailed results.
3. Keyed System. What is the simulated performance of the keynet and proposed vision sensor from
Section 3.5? To demonstrate proof of concept of the proposed keynet, we have implemented key-net
construction as outlined in section 3.4 in PyTorch. This prototype software exhibits exact inference per-
formance to within floating point error. Furthermore, we simulated the keynet optical element shown in
Figure 3 with simulation strategy described in detail in the supplemental material (section A.5). Results
are shown in table 4 for the keynets for three baseline conv-nets.
Table 4 shows experimental for three conv-net topologies: 5-layer LeNet, an 11-layer All-Convolutional
network [58] and a VGG-16 network [56]. All networks were constructed replacing max-pooling with av-
erage pooling, as per the keynet requirements. Results show the keynet memory requirements for a small
(LeNet), medium (AllConvNet) and large (VGG-16) conv-net as a function of the privacy parameter (α).
Naive implementation of the Toeplitz matrices in (4) results in an inefficient row-wise replication of the
convolutional kernel. In our supplemental software, we introduce a new tiled sparse matrix format which
provides compression of repeated submatrices. This results in a memory requirement for the keyed net-
work on the order of 4-8x larger than the unkeyed network, depending on the selection of the privacy
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⍺ LeNet AllConvNet VGG-16 LeNet AllConvNet LeNet AllConvNet LeNet AllConvNet
Baseline (no privacy) - 0.106 1.435 145.0 0.989 0.991 0.742 0.904 0.646 0.866
Keynet 2 0.111 6.131 221.7 0.989 0.991 0.742 0.904 0.646 0.866
Keynet (more privacy) 4 0.113 27.1 391.5 0.989 0.991 0.742 0.904 0.646 0.866
Keynet (most privacy) 8 0.181 100.1 1309.1 0.989 0.991 0.742 0.904 0.646 0.866
CIFAR-10 (sim)Network Parameters (M) MNIST CIFAR-10
Figure 4: Keynet results. Model parameters and classification accuracy on raw and optically simulated im-
ages for a small (lenet), medium (allconvnet) and large (VGG-16) conv-net and a keynets with increasing
privacy α = {2, 4, 8}.
parameter α. Next, we trained keynets on MNIST [33] and CIFAR-10 [30], using raw images, or simu-
lated optically transformed images from Section 3.5. Results show that the keynet achieves exact inference
performance with the baseline, and that the optical simulation results in slightly degraded performance due
to minor blurring of the image from fiber cross-talk. This provides proof of concept in simulation for the
keynet optical element.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced keynets, which are the first practical optical homomorphic encryption scheme
for the design of privacy preserving vision sensors. Our experimental results justify next steps which in-
clude: a comprehensive study of keynet semantic security as a function of privacy parameter α, GPU
optimization of sparse tiled matrix-vector multiplication to improve runtime and creation and testing
of a prototype optical element. Keynet software for reproducible research is available for download at
https://visym.github.io/keynet. This includes two prize challenge images and public keynets for attack
(§A.7.4) to encourage collaborative discovery of weaknesses in keynet security.
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A Supplemental Material
A.1 Notation
I Input image
x Input tensor
F Optical transform family
xˆ Keyed tensor
xˆ0 Vectorized optically transformed image
x0 Vectorized raw image
W Layerwise linear transformation
Wˆ Keyed layer, AWA−1
N Compositional conv-net function
Ni Layerwise conv-net function
N (x;W ) Conv-net with input x and parameters W
Nˆ Key-net with input Ax and parameters AWA−1
A Optical transformation matrix
g Non-linear activation function
| · |0 L0 norm
α User specified privacy parameter
Fα Fα ⊆ F , given privacy parameter α
D Photometric analog elementwise gain and bias
Π Stochastic matrix, geometric optical shuffling
A.2 Proof of Commutativity
Lemma A.1. The function composition f(g(h(x))) = P−1(ReLU(Px)) is commutative for generalized
permutation matrix P = DΠ with permutation matrix Π and diagonal matrix D, if D ≥ 0.
Proof. Let g(x) = ReLU(x) amd f(x) = P−1x and h(x) = Px. The function composition f(g(h(x))) =
P−1(ReLU(Px)) is commutative if the equivalence relation f(g(x))) = g(f(x)) holds. Given a diago-
nal matrix D ≥ 0 (i.e. has non-negative entries), the product P = DΠ for permutation matrix Π is
non-negative, since permutation matrices are monomial and the product of non-negative matrices is non-
negative. The function y = ReLU(x) is computed elementwise as yi = max(0, xi). Observe that any
non-negative scale factor β is commutative such that ReLU(βxi) = max(0, βxi) = βyi = β ReLU(xi),
since a non-negative scaling does not change the sign of xi. This can be written in matrix notation with
β on the diagonal of D, then ReLU(Dx) = D ReLU(x). Furthermore, since ReLU(x) is computed ele-
mentwise and Π is a one-to-one mapping (e.g. a permutation), Π−1ReLU(Πx) = ReLU(x). Therefore,
Π−1D−1ReLU(DΠx) = Π−1ReLU(D−1DΠx) = ReLU(Π−1D−1DΠx) = ReLU(x).
A.3 Proof of Sparsity Bound
Lemma A.2. Given a sparse matrix W and any A ∈ P and B ∈ P where P is the family of generalized
doubly stochastic matrices with privacy parameter α, there exists a sparsity upper bound |AWB|0 ≤
α2|W |0.
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Figure 5: Optically Transformed Convolutional Networks. In this example, a 2x2 image [11, 12; 21, 22] is
input to a 2 level convolutional network with a convolutional layer and ReLU layer, forming an inference
x2. The key-net is constructed from the conv-net using the private keys A, such that A1 is a linear trans-
formation implemented in the optics and analog processing of a custom vision sensor forming the sensor
observation xˆ0. This optically transformed sensor measurement is input to the key-net with output xˆ2. The
result of a forward pass in the conv-net is x2 = A−12 xˆ2, however the raw image x0 is never observed or
recovered to perform inference in the key-net.
Proof. Let Wk be a sparse matrix with exactly one non-zero element, then the decomposition W =∑
kWk such that if |W |0 = N then the decomposition has N terms. Then, for any conformal matrices A
and B, AWB =
∑
k AWkB. Since A ∈ P and B ∈ P , there exists a decomposition A = D
∑
i θiΠi
(resp. B = D
∑
j θjΠj). The sparsity pattern is upper bounded as |A|0 ≤ |
∑
i θiΠi|0, when setting
D = I . Each term AWiB can be expanded into exactly α2 terms of the form
∑
i,j θiθjΠiWkΠj . The
product ΠiWkΠj is a permutation of Wk with sparsity |ΠiWkΠj |0 = 1. Therefore, the sum of α2 terms
will have at most α2 non-zero elements for every non-zero element in W , hence |AWB|0 ≤ α2|W |0.
A.4 Keynet Example
Figure 5 shows a simple example of a key-net. In this example, there is a 2x2 raw image vectorized into a
4×1 vector (x0) which is input to a two level convolutional network. This network includes a convolutional
layer with kernel [−1, 1] (or equivalently a Toeplitz matrix W1), followed by a ReLU layer. The output of
this two layer convolutional network is a vector [1, 0, 1, 0]T . The key-net uses private keys A1 and A2 to
transform the input and network weights, such that the weights Wˆ1 cannot be factored to recover eitherA or
W . The key-net operates on the transformed input xˆ0 which is observed in a custom designed vision sensor
such that A1 is equivalent to a physically realizable optical and analog transformation chain. Inference in
a key-net operates equivalently to the conv-net with transformed weights of the form Wˆ = AWA−1, such
that the key-net output is a vector xˆ2 = A2x2. This output is equivalent to the conv-net output, encrypted
such that x2 = A−12 xˆ2. This is a homomorphism, enabled by an optical transformation A1.
A.5 Optical Realization
The sufficient conditions for an optical transform in section 3.1 define a feasible family of transformations
for use in a privacy preserving vision sensor. In this section, we show that the selected family of optical
transforms based on generalized stochastic matrices can be physically realized using an analog and optical
processing chain based on 3D printed incoherent fiber bundle faceplates.
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An optical fiber bundle faceplate is an optical element constructed using a bundle of multi-micron-
diameter optical fibers bundled into a thin plate with polished faces. An incoherent faceplate consists of
fiber optic strands that are shuffled and rotated so that the faceplace will unfaithfully transmit an image
from one face to the other, but in a deterministic manner. Recent work has demonstrated that optical fiber
faceplates can be constructed using 3D printing of thermoplastic filaments [64]. This enables large scale
manufacturing for design of privacy preserving vision sensors.
Figure 3 shows the design of the optical element to realize a generalized stochastic matrix. In this
design strategy, a lens focuses the light field of the scene onto the optical fiber bundle. This fiber bundle is
designed to implement the doubly stochastic matrix, which shuffles observed pixels and re-transmits them
to an alternate location, which is then observed by the CMOS sensor. Next, during pixel readout, analog
preprocessing applies an analog bias and gain. The resulting pixel readouts are converted from analog to
digital (ADC) forming the observed sensor measurement. The combination of the fiber bundle to imple-
ment the stochastic matrix fractional shuffling (Π) and the analog processing to implement the pixelwise
multiplicative scaling and additive bias (D) results in a physical realization of the optical transformation
in (7). Figure 3 (right) shows the optical simulation of the fiber bundle for a mild permutation, without
analog effects for visualization purposes. Simulation details are described in Section A.5.
A 3D printed incoherent fiber bundle faceplate includes the following primary design variables. First,
3D printed optics are air clad such that each fiber strand is separated from neighboring strands by an air
gap. This introduces crosstalk due to cladding leakage between fiber strands which reduces the optical
transmission fidelity. Second, 3D printed optics exhibits a minimum fiber diameter which limits the mini-
mum size of the each optical strand. This minimum dimension is specified by the diameter of the 3D print
head, which is on the order of 100µm on modern printers. This is two orders of magnitude larger than a
pixel pitch on a CMOS sensor, which requires that each strand covers a pixel neighborhood. Finally, fiber
optic transmission is specified by total internal reflection (TIR), which introduces a cone of projection from
the end of the fiber to the CMOS sensor. This introduces mixed pixels where the observed intensity is a
mixture of the contribution from all neighboring fibers. Figure 3 (right) shows examples of these modeling
errors which must be addressed during sensor calibration.
In Section 4, we addressed these modeling errors by simulating the fiber optic bundle using parame-
terization demonstrated by Wang et al. [64] and re-training the key-net to be invariant to these physically
realizable effects. In the remainder of this section, we will describe the simulation of the optical element
and the CMOS sensor to simulate the physically realized optical transformation.
A.5.1 Optical Simulation
An optical fiber bundle is simulated as follows. An image of arbitrary size is input to the simulation tools.
The image pixel size is designer defined. Next a padded mask is defined that is slightly larger than the
input image size, the pad size is designer selectable. The designer then sets the fiber core dimension in
the row direction and separately in the column direction. The simulator allows for a designer defined
open area to cladding ratio which allows for image information to be lost due to non-imaging areas in the
fiber bundle. Cladding and fiber core sizes are converted to number of pixels (using pixel size defined
above). A matrix of the centroids of each fiber core in the bundle is initialized. There is an option for
the designer to set a shearing factor which simulates manufacturing tolerances on the array of fiber cores
used to form the bundle. A masking matrix is defined such that for areas of the bundle entered on each
centroid matrix element and within the defined fiber core diameter light is transmitted, all other areas are
blocked to a designer defined value. The individual fibers are arranged in a brick-like pattern, i.e. the
core centers are offset by one half of the core diameter as the rows go down. The image is then masked
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with the core and interstitial matrices. The script then rasters through the image and fiber bundle to see
which parts of the image fall within allowed fiber cores and which parts are masked. All parts of the
image that fall within a given core are intensity averaged which sets the image resolution to be that of the
fiber core size. Lastly the designer can set crosstalk parameters for both the row and column directions of
the bundle which enables the designer to input manufacturing tolerances and/or use of blocking materials
between fibers. The crosstalk value operates like a kernel where the core image intensity is replaced by
the vertical crosstalk factor times the sum of the four nearest neighbor vertical core elements plus the
horizontal crosstalk factor times the sum of the two nearest neighbor horizontal core elements, normalized
to the image maximum pixel value, for every fiber core in the bundle. This composite image is then taken
as the input to the camera noise model defined below.
Figure 6 shows an example of this simulation. User configurable parameters for the fiber bundle
simulation are:
1. Image size
2. Fiber core size row, column
3. Fiber core/cladding area ratio
4. Fiber bundle shearing factor
5. Fiber interstitial blocking factor
6. Vertical and horizontal fiber crosstalk coefficients
A.5.2 CMOS Sensor Simulation
The sensor noise model begins with a given photon intensity hitting a given pixel, this can be set by scaling
the input image. The mean number of photons is given by µph and assumes Poisson statistics to calculate
the shot noise σ2ph (in the limit of large numbers of photons we can use a Gaussian approximation to the
Poisson distribution, this should be the case for this system). The sensor has a defined quantum efficiency
depending on the wavelength, sensor materials, and sensor construction geometry, denoted by ν This then
gives the number of photo electrons generated in the pixel µe which also follow Poisson statistics as:
µe = νµp. Since the statistics are Poisson the variance is also µe. In addition to shot noise, the sensor also
has a dark noise, i.e. photoelectrons are generated even in the absence of an optical signal. Usually this
dark current is integration time (and temperature) dependent and is due to thermally induced electrons.
The mean dark count is given by a constant term, µ0 and the integration time dependent term µI × tint
where µd is the sum of these two terms. Since the thermally induced electrons are also Poisson distributed
the dark count variance can be written as: σ2d = σ
2
d0 + µItint.
Finally, the sum of these sources of photoelectrons charge a capacitor which turns the signal into a
voltage, this gets amplified by a gain stage G and then is ultimately converted into a digital signal by the
ADC. This process is assumed to be linear and the camera usually has some over system gain Gsys that
converts electrons to digital counts out. The final signal is then given by: µgs = Gsys(µe + µd).
Since the signal model is linear and the noise sources are independent, we can RSS the noise sources.
As shown above the readout noise and amplifier noise can be lumped into a dark noise variance σ2d and
finally there is usually a noise associated with the final ADC stage, σ2q that typically has a uniform distri-
bution and is some camera dependent fraction of the digital scale output. Performing the RSS we get the
total camera noise as: σ2gs = G
2
sysσ
2
d + σ
2
q +G
2
sysµe
Adjustable parameters for the camera noise simulation are:
1. Sensor pixel size and number microns, N ×N
2. Sensor quantum efficiency - ν
3. Sensor dark noise µd, σ2d
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Figure 6: Optical Simulation of the 3D printed fiber bundle.
4. Sensor integration time - tint
5. Sensor gain on a per pixel basis specified by a gain matrix - Gij
6. ADC resolution and noise depth, σ2q
As an example, the input image and final output image of the fiber bundle simulator and camera noise
models is displayed in Figure 6.
A.6 Image Transformation Experiments
A privacy preserving vision system must obscure the image data from the perspective of a human observer,
while allowing for vision based tasks. In this section, we provide ancillary experiments that demonstrate
that off-the-shelf convolutional networks (and architectures) are subject to a privacy-performance trade-
off, which is a limiting factor compared to the keynet architecture.
In our experiments, we consider face identification and (later) object detection as the target machine
learning tasks. Face identification experiments were performed using the VGG-16 network architecture,
with a pre-trained model [46]. Experiments for object detection were conducted using a PyTorch im-
plementation of the Faster R-CNN object detector [52] trained on the MS-COCO dataset [38]. Where
applicable, network weights were finetuned using the ”training” subset and metrics are reported using the
”validation” subset. To report the identification performance of baseline and learned networks, we utilize
the Rank-1 classification accuracy. We acknowledge the limitations of the Rank-1 classification accuracy
as a measure of matching performance [43], but for the purposes of this work it is only used as as an indi-
cator of acceptable performance from the matcher, rather than a benchmark. Object detection performance
was measured using average precision over 80 classes, using the standard COCO evaluation metrics [38].
Human perceptual loss in images is measured by the Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) [66]. The moti-
vation for SSIM as a measurement to assess human observable changes in differences is owed to the fact
that humans are much more likely to perceive structural changes in images. Therefore, the SSIM is used
as a surrogate for image reconstruction fidelity between a reference (i.e., unmodified, ”clean” image) and
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Figure 7: Image transformations. a) Reference images, b) Null-space learning, c) Trained-system learning,
d) Geometric (permutation), low; e) Geometric (permutation), high; e) Combined geometric (low) and
trained-system. Note that each transformation obscures the image differently.
an optically transformed image. SSIM is a single-valued measurement and is defined in the range [0, 1],
where 0 denotes no similarity (privacy preserving) and 1.0 denotes the images are equivalent (not privacy
preserving).
A.6.1 Nullspace Learning for Frozen System
In Section 4, we pose a question asking if it is possible to identify an optical transformation that degrades
an input image, while retaining performance of an off-the-shelf (i.e., pretrained) ML system. In this
experiment, we utilize a learned linear image transformation of image I to degraded image Iˆ , with gain
and bias parameters a and b, respectively. For simplicity, in this experiment, we restrict learning to only
the gain parameter, a. Note that we also performed experiments with bias and gain/bias, which generated
similar conclusions. We also enforce a constraint projection such that Iˆ is in the integer range of [0, 255].
Iˆ = aI + b (8)
Next, we define an adversarial loss that combines the primary task and an adversarial task, where the
primary task is face identification and the adversarial task is image reconstruction (human perception).
This loss measures the performance of the target task relative to the adversarial task, such that this loss
is minimized when the target task performance is maximized and the adversarial task performance is
minimized.
loss = Lprimary + Ladversarial (9)
For a frozen ML system, the weights of the network cannot be modified. Intuitively, we know that
in order to retain matching performance, the convolutional responses of the network must be preserved.
Therefore, our primary loss (Lprimary) is defined as the L2 difference of network N at layer k. The idea
here is that if the convolutional responses at layer k are preserved, the downstream network responses will
also be preserved.
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a) b) c)
Figure 8: Adversarial learning examples. (a) Nullspace learning (b) Trained system learning (c) Tiled
trained system learning for object detection. These learned degradations exhibit a clear utility/privacy
tradeoff for face identification and object detection.
Lprimary = ||Nk(I)−Nk(Im)||2 (10)
The adversarial loss (Ladversarial) is the compliment of the SSIM function, since our goal is to mini-
mize the SSIM towards zero.
Ladversarial = 1− SSIM(I, Im) (11)
The middle-left set of images in Figure 7 illustrate an example of a nullspace learned image transfor-
mation for the face identification task, where the primary task loss was applied at the “conv5” layer of the
network. The reference (i.e., unmodified) images are in the upper left. Note that the transformed images
are minimally degraded; they appear darker and with some high frequency noise. This transformation is
not privacy preserving. Metrics from this experiment are a Rank-1 classification accuracy of 0.921 and an
SSIM value of 0.065. These metrics are also listed in the “Null Space” row of Table 1 and the training
output can be viewed in Figure 9. We emphasize that for this mask model, we were not able to learn a
transformation with a lower SSIM (human perception loss) that achieved reasonable performance at the
identification task.
A.6.2 Trained System Adversarial Learning
The previous experiment provides evidence that there does not exist an optical transformation that can
degrade an input image, while preserving performance of a pre-trained ML system. The logical next
question is to pose the question asking if such an optical transformation exists if we also jointly minimize
a ML task loss (as in §4, Trained System). If we can accomplish this joint learning task, a key-net would
also be unnecessary, as a fine-tuning exercise would be sufficient. In this section, we report on such an
experiment.
Out joint trained system retains the same mask model as the previous experiment. That is, the image
transformation is linear (8) without a bias parameter. As with the nullspace learning experiment, we utilize
an adversarial loss function, which is now regulated by an β parameter and switches between values of
0 and 1. When β = 0, the network weights are updated for the primary task and when β = 0, the
transformation weights are updated for the adversarial task. This approach was considered to ensure
degradation of the image would not be skewed toward background content. Note that for the primary task,
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the switching point occurred when the cross-entropy loss on the training set decreased below a value of
0.1 (i.e., saturated). For the adversarial task, the switching point occurred when the Rank-1 classification
rate on the validation data decreased below 86%.
loss = αLprimary + (1− β)Ladversarial (12)
Since in this experiment the weights of the ML system are being learned, we must adjust the Lprimary
loss term accordingly. For the face identification task, we set this loss term to be the cross-entropy loss
function. The adversarial loss term, Ladversarial, retains unchanged (11). The bottom-left set of images
in Figure 7 illustrate an example of a transformation learned from this approach (the reference images are
in the upper left). Here, we see a considerable increase in the magnitude of the transformation. Arguably,
it may be possible to infer that the example images are of faces, but it is very difficult to deduce the
identity, even when provided the reference image data. However, the trade-off for this transformation is a
slightly reduced identification rate. In this experiment, we achieved a rank-1 accuracy of 0.892, before the
adversarial loss saturated with an SSIM value of 0.007. This data is also reported in the “Trained System”
row of Table 1 and the training output can be viewed in Figure 9. Note that the Rank-1 accuracy from
training only slightly decreases as a function of training time. This behavior is due to the cyclical nature
of the joint optimization.
A.6.3 Geometric Trained System
In the previous two experiments, the image transformation directly modified the value(s) of the image
data. This is not the only mechanism for generating an image transformation. As described in §3.3, we
can also create a permutation matrix to “shuffle” the image data, which can destroy visual cues for human
identification. Intuitively, we expect that permuting an image would cause a pretrained ML algorithm to
fail at its task on this type of data. In this section, we explore whether it is possible to finetune a pretrained
network to perform its primary task, except with permuted image data.
In this experiment, the actual image transformation is not learned. Instead, the transformation func-
tion was carefully crafted to minimize convolutional responses specifically from the VGG-16 network.
The transformation function used permutes blocks of neighboring pixels globally an locally. The global
transformation is a constant translation for each block. The local transformation is a localized permutation
within the image block. This approach also allows us to regulate (or parameterize) the “amount” of shuf-
fling that is applied. Optically, this mask model is a surrogate for a custom optical element utilizing fiber
bundles. The top-right and middle-right set of images in Figure 7 illustrate examples of permuted images
using a low-shuffling (top-right) and a high-shuffling (middle-right) approach. Note that the low-shuffling
approach appears similar to a blurring function. These images are still very human recognizable. The high-
shuffling approach however generates images that are not human recognizable. As with the trained system
adversarial learning results, it may be possible to deduce that these (permuted) images are of faces, but
it is not possible to infer identity. We observed that after finetuning the VGG-16 network, the validation
accuracy saturated at approximately 94% and 83% for the low-shuffling and high-shuffling approaches,
respectively. These metrics are also reported in Table 1 in the “Geometric (low)” and “Geometric (high)”
rows, respectively. The training output can be viewed in Figure 9. Note that for the “high” geometric
transformation, the initial identification performance decreases to zero, but is quickly recovered (up to a
point). Again, we find there is a privacy trade-off between the achieved identification performance and the
reconstruction loss. We hypothesize that this loss in identification performance is due to violating locality
of feature data and introducing edges from each local permutation block.
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Table 1: Summary of baseline and optical transformation performance for the face identification task.
Experiment Rank-1 Accuracy SSIM
None (Baseline) 0.945 1.0
Null Space 0.921 0.065
Trained System 0.892 0.007
Geometric (low) 0.940 0.339
Geometric (high) 0.830 0.057
Combined 0.891 0.004
Figure 9: Summary of Rank-1 classification performance achieved for each face identification learning
experiment vs. training run-time. A privacy preserving ML system must achieve similar performance
to the unmodified baseline (dashed). Note that all of these approaches exhibit some amount of privacy-
performance trade-off.
A.6.4 Combined Trained System
In this experiment, we combine the trained system approaches in §A.6.2 and §A.6.3. Here, the fine-
tuned network for a “low” geometric transformation is also trained to learn a degraded image (8). We do
not perform this experiment with the “high” geometric transformation because the identification perfor-
mance is too low (83%) and learning the image degradation would only further reduce performance. The
bottom-right row of images in Figure 7 illustrates examples of this transformation. This combination of
transformations achieved a negligible difference in rank-1 identification accuracy (0.891 vs. 0.892) and
SSIM value (0.004 vs 0.007) compared to the trained system approach without geometric permuting of the
image data. These metrics are reported in Table 1 within the “Combined” row and the training output can
be viewed in Figure 9.
A.6.5 Object Detection
The previous experiments demonstrate that for the face identification task, it is possible to (digitally) apply
an optical transformation to an image that strongly reduces human perception (via SSIM) with a small loss
in identification performance. Assuming the optical transformations are physically realizable, the image
data is not representative of an end-to-end image acquisition to classification task. In an end-to-end task,
the face data must be detected from a raw, full-scene image, prior to classification. As such, we performed
an experiment to evaluate whether faces could be detected on transformed images.
In our preliminary face detection experiment, we applied the trained system optical transform (§A.6.2)
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Baseline
Joint tiled gain, non-centered (⍺=1E3) Joint tiled gain, aug (⍺=1E3)
Joint tiled gain, aug (⍺=1E2)
Experiment AP AP (small)
AP 
(large)
Relative 
AP (%) SSIM
Baseline 0.3653 0.2086 0.4773 100% 1.0
Joint gain (⍺=1E5) 0.2300 0.0883 0.3455 63.0% 0.14
Joint gain (⍺=1E6) 0.1413 0.0408 0.2490 38.7% 0.06
Joint tiled gain 0.1639 0.0396 0.2844 44.9% 0.06
Joint tiled gain, non-centered (⍺=1E3) 0.2178 0.0640 0.3515 59.6% 0.14
Joint tiled gain, non-centered (⍺=1E1) 0.3454 0.1885 0.4594 94.6% 0.42
Joint tiled gain, non-centered (⍺=1E2) 0.3015 0.1391 0.4243 82.5% 0.16
Joint tiled gain, aug (⍺=1E2) 0.2965 0.1352 0.4241 81.2% 0.21
Joint tiled gain, aug (⍺=1E3) 0.2120 0.0625 0.3451 58.0% 0.07
Figure 10: Object detection training study. Results with photometric optical transformation under different
tiling and hyperparameter assumptions. See Section A.6.5 for details.
to images in the VGG-Face-1 validation set and executed a face detector. The face detector was based
on the Faster-R-CNN convolutional network and trained to detect faces in natural images. We observed a
0.0% detection rate on the transformed images, which suggests that the detector must also be trained for
an actual end-to-end system.
Next, we conducted an experiment to extend the trained system adversarial learning to a detection and
classification task. Here, The object detection system is the Faster R-CNN convolutional network, trained
on the MS-COCO object dataset. The primary machine learning task is localization and classification of
80 object classes (e.g. people, vehicles) and the adversarial machine learning task is structural similarity
(SSIM) to degrade the image to reduce human perceptibility. In our experiment, we considered eight
total configurations. Each configuration is listed in Figure 10 (left). Where denoted, “tiled gain” refers
to the tiling of pretrained optical transforms from the face detection task. “Joint gain” denotes learning
of an optical transform using the full scene image. Evaluation metrics are: AP=average precision, AP
for small or large objects only, Relative performance=AP ratio relative to baseline showing performance
loss between experimental configurations and baseline, SSIM=structural similarity index. Examples of
applied image transforms are illustrated in Figure 10 (right). Results show that there is a strong trade-off in
detection performance relative to the baseline. Similar to the null-space experiments for face identification,
as it was not possible to learn a full-scene optical transform that did not exhibit considerable performance
loss. These results continue to suggest evidence that alternative training strategies are not sufficient for
privacy preservation and our key-net approach is required.
A.6.6 Summary
In this section, we performed experiments that justify the necessity of a keynet architecture for a pri-
vacy preserving vision sensor (§4). These experiments demonstrate that traditional conv-net architectures
cannot be refactored to be privacy preserving with indirect (e.g., nullspace learning) or direct (e.g., joint
adversarial learning, geometric data permutations) training of the ML algorithm. In each example there is
a clear limit and tradeoff on the extent of human perception loss and performance of the primary ML task.
This is evidenced in Table 1, which reports the achieved Rank-1 accuracy (primary task metric) and SSIM
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(human perception loss metric) for the face identification task. In contrast, a key-net does not inherit this
privacy-performance tradeoff as its design is fully homomorphic (§3.2).
A.7 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we discuss keynet privacy. First, we connect the problem of recovering source conv-net
weights to the problem of non-negative matrix factorization. Next, we show that the form of encryption we
pose is an example of the Hill cipher, a classic cryptosystem based on linear algebra. Finally, we discuss
the primary concern on semantic security, and introduce a challenge problem for the community to analyze
it.
A.7.1 Non-negative Matrix Factorization
Non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) [35] is defined as follows. Given a matrix V = WH , factor V
into terms (W,H) subject to the constraint (W,H) ≥ 0, such that elements of the factors are non-negative.
Non-negative matrix factorization in general is NP-hard, with special polynomial time factorizations where
V is known low rank.
Let AWA−1 be grouped as A(WA−1). In general, for positive definite matrix A with non-negative
entries, the inverse A−1 will not be non-negative. Let B = (WA−1), then B can be decomposed element-
wise into the sum of non-negative terms asB = Bp−Bn whereBpi=0 ifBi < 0 elseBi (Bni=0 ifBi > 0
else −Bi, resp.). Then,
Wˆ = A(Bp −Bn) (13)
Wˆ = ABp −ABn (14)
which transforms the matrix Wˆ into the sum of products of non-negative matrices. The elements of A
are non-negative by assumption, and the elements of Bn and Bp are non-negative by construction, so
then factorization of ABp or ABn reduces to non-negative matrix factorization to recover the desired non-
negative factor A, which can be used to recover A−1 and W . An efficient solution to this factorization
requires a polynomial time solution to non-negative matrix factorization, for which exact NMF is NP-hard
for full rank matrices [3][61]. Finally, in the case where exhaustive search is possible for “small” matrices
V , NMF in general is non-unique unless further constrained [28]. So, even if NMF is feasible, the matrix
decomposition to recover exactly A is still infeasible.
A.7.2 Hill Cipher
The form of optical transformation described is known in the cryptographic literature as a Hill cipher
[27]. The Hill cipher is a classic cryptosystem based on a linear transformation matrix as secret key.
Transformed images (Ax) are robust to cryptanalysis and can be safely made public, as long as the key A
is kept secret. Furthermore, as described in section A.7.1, the product AWA−1 is also secure to known
ciphertext attacks, due to the hardness of non-negative matrix factorization. This enables public disclosure
of both optical transformed images and key-nets, while ensuring security of raw images and source network
weights.
However, the Hill cipher exhibits a two known weaknesses in the form of chosen plaintext and chosen
ciphertext attacks. In a chosen plaintext attack scenario, the unknown A can be recovered through least
squares regression with at least N tuples (x,Ax), for A with known sparsity |A|0 = N . However, this
requires that the attacker has physical access to the sensor, and in this scenario, privacy has already been
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Figure 11: Keynet challenge problem. These images contain a secret message. We will release these
images along with their paired keynet to challenge the research community to discover a weakness in
semantic security of our proposed approach.
compromised. The sensor can be assumed to be locked in a private space such as the home, with physical
access restricted to authorized users, so tuples (x,Ax) cannot be collected by policy.
The Hill cipher also exhibits a weakness to chosen ciphertext attack. In this attack scenario, the
adversary is provided decryptions A−1y of a chosen ciphertext y. Like the chosen plaintext attack, the
unknown A−1 can be estimated using least squares regression. However, the key-nets will not be used in
this scenario by design, as the image does not require decryption and the output inferences can be public.
So, while the Hill cipher does have a weakness as a general cryptosystem, we believe it is an appropriate
and practical assumption for a privacy preserving vision sensor.
Finally, the most challenging requirement is proving semantic security. Semantic security is the prob-
lem of exposing information about the plaintext given only the ciphertext. For example, in a key-net
consider the case where the optical transformation function is the identity matrix. The resulting key-net is
exactly the source network, and the encrypted images are identical to the raw images. Clearly, this provides
no security. A more subtle challenge for semantic security is when the optical transformation is a diagonal
matrix or a permutation matrix. In section A.7.3, we discuss that these transformations exhibit a semantic
security weakness, which exposes the structure of Wˆ to attack. We discuss that using the generalized
stochastic matrix with privacy parameter α > 1 shows promise to defend against this attack.
A.7.3 Semantic Security
Semantic security is the problem of exposing information about the plaintext given only the ciphertext. A
subtle challenge with semantic security considers the case where the degradation is either a scaling or a
permutation rather than a generalized stochastic matrix. In the case of a scaling, the weakness leverages
natural image statistics for recovery, such that gradients are sparse for neighboring pixels (e.g. images
are smooth almost everywhere). For example, blind deconvolution techniques with Total Variation (TV)
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regularization can be used in some cases to jointly recover the unknown degradation kernel and the original
image. For key-net attacks, the concept is to leverage the distribution of sparse gradients in natural images,
which can be used to regularize this ill-posed problem to recover the unknown image mask and raw image.
Future work will consider these different optimization strategies to determine conditions for which image
reconstruction using this strategy is feasible.
A second subtle challenge for semantic security is when the optical transformation is a permutation
matrix. In this case, the neighborhood structure of a convolution is present in the non-zero structure of the
Toeplitz matrices in the key-net. The keyed layers of the key-net are public information, so the sparsity
structure of the weights can be inspected and used by an attacker. For example, there exists a greedy op-
timization based on graph embedding to recover the structure of a permuted image with known neighbors
simply by minimizing the pairwise embedding distance of pixels. This is analogous to “puzzle solving”,
with the simplification that puzzle piece neighbors are observable in the sparsity pattern in the Toeplitz
matrices which implement keyed convolutions. This is not a risk if the key-net is kept private, but if the
key-net is public, then Wˆ exposes private information about Ax. Introducing the privacy parameter α
can mitigate this attack by making the neighborhood structure ambiguous by increasing the sparsity of W
by a user specified privacy factor that is independent of the true neighborhood structure. This introduces
a tradeoff between inference runtime/memory and privacy that mitigates this attack. Furthermore, com-
bining the permutation with an analog scaling and bias results in limiting the attack due to natural image
statistics. Future work will investigate the feasibility of this style of attack for key-net images as a function
of α.
Finally, the conditions listed in Section 3.1 are sufficient, but not necessary. Future work will ex-
plore alternative selections of the image key A0 that are positive semi-definite. In this case, the sensor
observation cannot be inverted to recover the image, even under a plaintext attack, since the least squares
optimization is under determined. In the key-net framework, we would set A−10 = I and continue the
key-net encoding as currently described. This would further protect against semantic security attacks, but
would likely introduce a utility/privacy tradeoff which would degrade the trained ML task performance as
A0 becomes increasingly rank deficient.
A.7.4 Challenge Problem
Finally, we plan on publicly releasing the challenge images in figure 11 and associated public key-nets for
a lenet and vgg-16 topology. These challenge images contain a secret message that can only be discovered
by exploting a weakness in semantic security. We would like to encourage the community to collaborate
to discover such weaknesses in our approach by sponsoring a prize challenge. These images and public
keynets are available for analysis at https://visym.github.io/keynet.
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